Pierre Maranda

Anthropologie, retraité de l’enseignement, Université Laval

“Mythology. Selected Readings.
Introduction.”

in Mythology. Selected Readings edited by Pierre Maranda, pp. 7-20. Harmondsworth : Penguin Books Ltd., 1972, 320 pp.  Collection : Penguin Modern Sociology Readings.

A sketch of the modern anthropological theory of myth forms the first part of this introduction. The other part consists essentially of a table summarizing the contributions grouped in the thirteen Readings that follow. Both parts make explicit the basic issues broached in this volume.

The first part comprises (1) a brief historical review ; (2) a test to help the reader grasp fundamental aspects of the modem theory of myth, and (3) a glance at the codes in which our literate and technological societies couch their myths. Because of its synthetic character, the introduction should probably be read again after the book has been perused in its entirety.

What is myth ?

Among those opinions which are produced by a little knowledge, to be dispelled by a little more, is the belief in an almost boundless creative power of the human imagination...

The office of our thought is to develop, to combine and to derive, rather than to create...

The treatment of similar myths from different regions, by arranging them in large compared groups, makes it possible to trace in mythology the operation of imaginative processes recurring with the evident regularity of mental law ; and thus stories of which a single instance would have been a mere isolated curiosity, take their place among wellmarked and consistent structures of the human mind. Evidence like this will again and again drive us to admit that even as 'truth is stranger than fiction', so myth may be more uniform than history (Tylor. 1871, pp. 273, 274, 282).

The Sherente of Central Brazil heard the story of the Original Sin. When they retell it, they modify it considerably. Among other alterations, they recast Adam and Eve as brother and sister — otherwise, the myth would be meaningless for those unclothed but sophisticated people, for how could a man and a woman be ashamed of standing naked in each other's presence ?

The Sherente reformulation exemplifies the mythic process. [8] Shame is a strong component [1], of their semantic system and must be a reaction to an equally strong actual situation. But the juxtaposition of a naked man and a naked woman does not constitute a strong situation in their culture. Therefore, another relation must be substituted for it. Working up from the effect — shame — to a cause that could account for it while respecting the data — a naked man juxtaposed to a naked woman — the Sherente drew an inference perfectly logical in terms of their culture, viz. Adam and Eve must be redefined as siblings. Thus, because of the incest taboo, which is a strong component of the Sherente culture, a strong situation is created whenever a risk occurs of violating the taboo. A strong reaction, shame, is then adequately motivated. Now, the alteration of the cast rests upon what Tylor called a derivation. A new relation, siblingship, is derived from the cultural system and brought to bear on the situation. This relation is deeper, semantically, than the one in the Bible, as the incest taboo is more universal than a particular form of modesty. [2]

Numerous similar cases of culture change in other areas provide the same type of evidence. In Tylor's words, and also as made clear in Lévi-Strauss's work, the life of myths consists in reorganizing traditional components in the face of new circumstances or, correlatively, in reorganizing new, imported components in the light of tradition. More generally, the mythic process is a learning device in which the unintelligible — randomness — is reduced to the intelligible —- a pattern : 'Myth may be more uniform than history.'

Accordingly, the analysis of myth aims at discovering the rules governing combinations, developments and derivations, i.e. at pointing out the operations that reduce the alien to familiar structures within a given range of possible variations. It is essentially the investigation of the culture‑conditioning mechanisms that mould ethnic cognitive systems.

Before proposing a more precise definition of myth, it will be useful to review briefly the emergence of its components over the [9] last seventy years. [3] The first breakthrough occurred in Hubert and Mauss's monograph on sacrifice (1897-1898), 'a brilliant analysis of the mechanism of sacrifice, or perhaps one should say of its logical structure, or even of its grammar' (Evans-Pritchard, 1965, p. 71) ; the same is true of their essay on magic (1902-1903). Their approach led to the formulation of the concept of 'collective representations’ which the Année Sociologique used and developed. Related to that fundamental work and actually inspired by it, the linguistic revolution came about. Most relevant to the present purpose is de Saussure's famous distinction between langue ('language') and parole ('speech'). In effect, as knowledge of a specific language is prerequisite to speech acts, so are specific collective representations prerequisite to language. [4]

Boas, at approximately the same time as de Saussure, stated an equivalent position which bridges the distance between collective representations and language. To him, the contrast is a matter of conscious v. unconscious [5] aspects of linguistic phenomena. The following passage contains germinally the substance of the contributions grouped hereafter in several Readings of this book, especially those in Part One.

To draw a parallel again between this ethnological phenomenon [modesty] and linguistic phenomena, it would seem that the common [10] feature of both is the grouping together of a considerable number of activities under the form of a single idea, without the necessity of this idea itself entering into consciousness. The difference, again, would lie in the fact that the idea of modesty is easily isolated from other concepts, and that then secondary explanations are given of what is considered modest and what not. I believe that the unconscious formation of these categories is one of the fundamental traits of ethnic life, and that it even manifests itself in many of its more complex aspects ; that many of our religious views and activities, of our ethnical concepts, and even our scientific views, which are apparently based entirely on conscious reasoning, are affected by this tendency of distinct activities to associate themselves under the influence of strong emotions. It has been recognized before that this is one of the fundamental causes of error and of the diversity of opinions (Boas, 1911, n.d., pp. 58-59 ; see also pp. 18-21. and 52-61).

There are indeed 'single ideas' whose semantic power is measurable in terms of the 'number of activities' which they can 'group together'. Such ideas come up in myths which map them out into cognitive and emotional charters, as it were, which vary from culture to culture. Thus, according to our own cognitive and emotional charter, according to our own collective representation of modesty, we are much more sensitive to nakedness than most peoples of the world. Our notion is more encompassing and therefore more superficial than that of, say, the Sherente (see below. pp. 11, 15). Conversely, we are proud of some 'achievements' that trigger shame reactions elsewhere, e.g. accumulation of wealth for personal use instead of for distribution or for its destruction in potlatches.

The 'unconscious formation of these (ethnic) categories' is fundamental and moulds religions, ethnical systems and even scientific thought. All of these, according to the definition to be proposed shortly are actualizations of culture-specific myths. 'Distinct activities associate themselves under the influence of strong emotions' and along the grooves of category formation staked in mythologies. 'It has been recognized before that this is one of the fundamental causes of error and of the diversity of opinions', and also one of the fundamental causes of scientific discoveries and of social consensus (cf. Kroeber, 1963). People can communicate in so far as they share common if subliminal cultural axioms and it is by virtue of such intersections or disjunctions [11] that sects, political parties and nations are inwardly — by agreement — and outwardly — by opposition — united.

Also at approximately the same time as de Saussure and Boas, the Russian Formalist school contributed to the new approach. Propp's paper (Reading 7) offers a good summary of the theory and of the method. Further developments are found in the recent works of Meletinsky, Segal (Reading 12), and their associates (1969).

Chomsky has reactivated similar perspectives under a new terminology. He distinguishes between 'deep structures' and 'competence' on the one hand, and 'surface structures' and 'performance' on the other. His original reluctance, now at least partly overcome, to take semantics into account, keeps his model from being as powerful as those of the other scholars reviewed here.

Lévi-Strauss has been more explicit than most on the theory of myth. He formulated basic propositions as early as 1949 :

the world of symbolism is infinitely varied in contents, but always limited in its laws.... A compilation of known myths and tales would fill an imposing number of volumes. But they can be reduced to a small number of simple types if we abstract, from among the diversity of characters, a few elementary functions (1964, pp. 203-204 ; cf. the quote from Tylor, p. 7 and Lévi-Strauss, 1969, pp. 341-342).

In 1956, shortly after his famous paper 'The structural study of myth', [6] he concluded an analysis :

We see, then, what a structural analysis of the myth content can achieve in itself : it furnishes rules of transformation which enable us to shift from one variant to another by means of operations similar to those of algebra (1964, p. 235). [7]

[12]

In his continuing Mythologiques, Lévi-Strauss shows how elementary functions do structure vast sets of symbols (Reading 13). His transformational analysis reaches beyond linguistic processes : it tackles the operations of the invariant human mind coping with variant environments and trying to reduce them to manageable systems. Like the scientist, the mythmaker builds homomorphisms, and both make their tasks easier by always bracketing away some dimensions. [8]

Myths solve problems or declare them unsolvable as elegantly as pure mathematics, but their language is more difficult to learn. 'The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigourous as that of modern science, and ... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of the things to which it is applied' (Lévi-Strauss, 1964, p. 230).

A definition of myth will now bring this section to an end.

Definition. Myths display the structured, predominantly culture-specific, and shared, semantic systems which enable the members [13] of a culture area to understand each other and to cope with the unknown. More strictly, myths are stylistically definable discourses that express the strong components of semantic systems.

'Discourses' refer to the articulation of narrative units into a plot (for details on units and plot models, see Meletinsky, Nekludov, Novik and Segal, 1969 ; Köngäs Maranda and Maranda, 1971). 'Stylistically definable' means features of formulation which are characteristic of culture areas (see references in Maranda, 1971 ; 1972b, and parts of Lessa7s contribution, Reading 4). 'Strong components' is to be understood according to Digraph Theory, i.e. the elementary structures of myth are terms so related that they have the properties of cycles which are either sources or sinks (Harary, Norman and Cartwright, 1965 ; Maranda and Köngäs Maranda, 1970 ; Maranda, 1972b). Finally, 'semantic systems' add to the concept of 'collective representations' that these are structured cognitive guidelines as products of historical accretions and of mental processes.

Myths and minds

The purpose of the following test is to demonstrate Boas's fundamental point - myth as a conditioning process. Three components, which are strong ones in quite a few semantic systems, will be used. They are 'man', 'woman' and 'snake'. The test requires that the reader fill in the empty cells in Table I before looking at Table 2. Write in each of the four boxes what you assume the relationship would be, in a European myth, between the three components in question (for instance, if you think the snake would eat up the woman, write'eat up' under woman as receiver, at the end of the first row ; if you assume that there is no direct interaction, write X in the cell where the two dramatis personae intersect).

[14]

Now, it can be predicted (probability of over 80 per cent) that you have filled the empty cells with terms more or less synonymous with those in Table 2.

But give the same test to a Melanesian of the Eastern Solomon Islands : the matrix would be filled as follows :

Why, for a European, are European responses highly predictable and, correlatively, non‑European responses difficult if not impossible to predict ? 'Symbols' have different meanings in different cultures, and different relationships prevail between the same 'symbols' when we pass from one culture to another. Symbols that share the same semantic function are 'paradigmatic sets' in modern terminology ; when two symbols belonging to different paradigmatic sets are connected by a relation, they form what is called a 'syntagmatic chain'. In our areas, for most people, 'snake' belongs to the paradigmatic set of 'repulsive' or 'evil' things ; in many other culture areas, it belongs to the paradigmatic set of 'primeval fecundity'. 'Man' and 'woman' are cross-culturally more neutral ; generally, their meaning is positional [15] in that it is determined by their relations to other, stronger terms. The connection between 'snake' and 'woman' is a syntagmatic chain resulting from their association through a specific relation. But relations in turn are contingent upon what they connect. Of all the available relations within a semantic system, only a limited number can serve in the construction of specific chains. For example, the relation between a bear as emitter and an infant as receiver may be that of 'parent' or 'kidnapper' but hardly that of 'lover'. In our culture, the phallus‑snake association suggests a relation of sexual intercourse with 'woman' as receiver, but the most common relation is that of 'deceiver'. Consequently, the association between 'snake' arid 'woman', along with others that are redundant in this respect, [9] draws the latter towards the paradigmatic set 'evil' to which the former belongs by virtue of Genesis. In contrast, the Melanesian relation between the same terms is 'female parent', with snake as emitter. Consequently, 'woman' is pulled closer to the set 'fecundity' since snake is so defined semantically.

Within a semantic universe, some combinations of, i.e. relations between, elements are common, others are permissible but rare, others are poetic or archaic, and others are excluded (see note 4, above). Communication becomes increasingly difficult as one moves farther away from the semantic grooves of one's culture. [10] The interest of comparative analysis lies in the operators necessary to pass from one system to another : dimensional depth becomes measurable as well as the differential use of operators by different cultures (see Köngäs Maranda, 1969 ; Buchler and Selby, 1969 ; Maranda, 1969).

Thus, because the Sherente operator to pass from the Christian to their version of the story of the Original Sin is a restriction of extension by the addition of an attribute (siblingship), we see, that our concept of shame is readily triggered by a skin-deep reaction (one step in Figure 1), whereas that of the Sherente, blood-linked, is not as easily activated (two steps in Figure 1).

[16]

To summarize this experiment, we could say, inspired by Rousseau, that human communication is a social contract which rests on a body of subliminal laws, and that a culture's myths contain its semantic jurisprudence. Whether this can be reduced to an algebra depends on the power of the analyst. The rules are there at any rate, as evidenced by the fact that those unable or unwilling to abide and be conditioned by them are either confined into mental hospitals or marked off as foreigners.

The princess' depilatory and the hero's habr tonic

Myths, in our complex societies, are manifested in idioms different from those in which they were expressed in the past and in which they are still expressed in traditional societies. The passage from one idiom to another was effected through a recoding process that became generalized with the spread of literacy and technology. [11]

The triumph of the small but clever one over the clumsy giant May be narrated by an elder in a remote European hamlet in the form of a folktale or it can be found on television and cinema screens, not to mention comic strips. It is also repeated in wide circulation magazines and newspapers in the North American advertisements of Volkswagen cars. Like the clever little one, like the Bible's David, the buyer of a VW has plenty of power in reserve — mental power (as he beats the system, Detroit's big vehicles).

[17]

Then, it makes little difference, still in technological societies, that the metamorphosis of a 'beast' into a handsome male, who will conquer the glamouring princess in the Eden of ads, be the work of a tradition‑consolidated magical agent or of mass‑media established brands of deodorants or mouthwashes. Little does it matter, similarly, whether Cinderella becomes a mysteriously seductive woman with the help of her godmother or that of a skin beautifying soap. Technology convinces us that it can achieve what our forefathers thought magic would do. The syntagmatic chains that moulded, and lived through, our ancestors, still perpetuate themselves among us, from the poet to the advertising agency, the cartoonist to the scriptwriter to the novelist. And our paradigmatic sets are also consistently traditional : variations in contents erode semantic grooves very little, for the functions that direct the flow of imagery are as deeply seated as our conceptual habits. Cinderella, salesgirls, devoted housewives, Jack (of the beanstalk), newspaper boys, tired executives — all feel, at the back of their minds, the nagging dream of the great adventure that culminates in long-lasting and private blissfulness.

But Melanesians find our myths boring and our advertisements tasteless. A stray issue of the Playboy magazine was received with shrugs in North Malaita, in the Solomon Islands. How could those girls be found attractive when the local canon of female beauty is a freshly shaven head ? In those islands, the happy dream is that of a numerous progeniture so that one will be sure of a restful after-life.

Our myths are made of depilatories, royalty, pets, antiques, political ideologies, religion, hair tonics, cinemactors, scientific theories, cars, etc. - enticing avenues to the Paradise of which, ultimately we refuse to acknowledge the loss. Long ago, many strong components of our semantic systems were expressed as well as consolidated in the book of Genesis. God and the make still thrive among us.

The contents of this book

The five Parts m which the selections are distributed as well as selection assignment to each Part will be considered arbitrary by some. Table 4 attempts to be somewhat descriptive of the contents of this volume. The table's domains and their subdivision [18] are, inevitably, over-simplifications. The labels are crude. They purport to be only indicative and that in very general terms. They should become more meaningful, and the distortions they impose more easily discerned, if the table is examined again after the papers have been read.

The methods grouped in this book‑are supposed to be powerful. Each Reading is its own evidence in this respect and the readers will judge. In order to be in a position to pronounce oneself, [19] though, one should first test the methods on other bodies of data, and preferably on data with which one is already familiar. It should be kept in mind, too, that valid as it may be for given purposes, a method does not necessarily meet the objectives of all those who try it. [12]

References

BUCHLER, I. R., and SELBY, H. A. (1968), 'A formal study of myth', Monograph Series no. 1, Center for Intercultural Studies in Folklore and Oral History, University of Texas Press.

BOAS, F. (1911), 'Introduction', 'Handbook of American Indian languages', Bulletin, 40, Part I, Bureau of American Ethnology ; published separately (n.d.), Georgetown University Press.

EVANS-RITCHARD, E. E. (1965), Theories of Primitive Religion, Clarendon Press. [La version française est disponible dans Les classiques des sciences sociales: URL.]

HARARY, F., NORMAN, R. Z., and CARTWRIGHT, D. (1965), Structural Models : An Introduction to the Theory of Directed Graphs, Wiley.

HUBERT, H., and MAUSS, M. (1897-1898), « Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice'. L'Année sociologique, vol. 2 ; English translation, Sacrifice : Its Nature and Function (1964), University of Chicago Press. URL.

HUBERT, M., and MAUSS, M. (1902-3), 'Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie', L’Année sociologique, vol. 7 ; reprinted in M. Mauss (1950), Sociologie et Anthropologie, Presses Universitaires de France. URL.

KÖNGÄS MARANDA, E. K. (1969), 'Structure des énigmes', L'Homme, vol. 9, pp. 5-48.

KÖNGÄS MARANDA, E. K. (1970), 'Perinteen transformaatiosããntöjen tutkimisesta', Virittäjä, pp. 277-292 (French Summary, p. 292).

KÖNGÄS MARANDA, E. K. (1971), 'Theory and practice of riddle analysis', in R. Bauman (ed.), Toward New Perspectives in Folklore, J. Amer. Folklore, vol. 84, pp. 51-61.

KÖNGÄS MARANDA, E. K., and MARANDA, P. (1971), Structural Models in Folklore and Transformational Essays, 2^nd edn, Mouton.

KROEBER, A. L. (1963), Configurations of Culture Growth, University of California Press.

LÉVI-STRAUSS, C. (1949), Les Structures élémentaires de la parenté, P.U.F.

LÉVI-STRAUSS, C. (1964), Structural Anthropology, Basic Books ; original French edition, Anthropologie structurale (1958), Plon.

[20]

LÉVI-STRAUSS, C. (1969), The Raw and the Cooked, Harper ; original French edition, Mythologiques I. Le cru et le cuit (1964), Plon.

MARANDA, P. (1969), review of I. R. Buchler and H. A. Selby (1968), Amer. Anthropol., vol. 71, pp. 521-523.

MARANDA, P. (1971), 'The computer and the analysis of myths', Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales, UNESCO, vol. 23, pp. 244-254.

MARANDA, P. (1972a), 'Anthropological analytics : Lévi-Strauss's concept of social structure', in H. Nutini and I. R. Buchler, (eds.), The Anthropology of C. Lévi-Strauss, Appleton-Century-Crofts.

MARANDA, P. (1972b), 'Cendrillon ct la théorie des ensembles', in Structures et genres de la littérature ethnique, Proceedings of the Palermo Symposium (1970), Associazone per la conservazione delle traditione popolare.

MARANDA, P., DUNDEs, A., LEACH, E. R., and MAYBURY-LEWIS, D. (1971), 'An experiment : notes and queries from the desk, with a reply by the ethnographer', in P. Maranda and E. K. Köngäs Maranda (e ds.), Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition, University of Pennsylvania Press.

MARANDA, P., and KÖNGÄS MARANDA, E. K. (1970), 'Le Crâne et l'utérus : deux théorèmes nord-malaitains', in J. Pouillon and P. Maranda (eds.), Échange et Communications, 2 vols., Mouton.

MARANDA, P., and KÖNGÄS ; S MARANDA, E. K. (1971), 'Introduction', in Structural Analysis of Oral Tradition, University of Pennsylvania Press.

MELETINSKY, E. M., NEKLUDOV, S. J., NOVIK, S., and SEGAL, D. M. (1969), 'Problemy strukturnogo opisanija volshebnoj skazki', Trudy po znakovym sistemam, vol. 4, pp. 86-135. English translation in P. Maranda, ed., Soviet Structural Folkloristics, Mouton, in press.

TYLOR, E. B. (1871), Primitive Culture, Murray ; Harper & Row.